Social Metaphysics

Summary

This course surveys fundamentalist approaches to social metaphysics. Fundamentalism is the study of social metaphysics using the tools of metaphysical fundamentality — grounding, essence, naturalness, truthmaking, etc. The fundamentalist approach sees social metaphysics as continuous with general metaphysics (the study of more general features of reality like time, material objects, existence, and so on). Fundamentalism also sees social metaphysics as deep; the nature of the social world can diverge strongly from the way we represent it. This is a social metaphysics course that, after having taken, you will know something substantial about contemporary metaphysics more generally.

How to Read This

This is not a full syllabus; it has neither specific assignments nor page numbers for reading excerpts. It is a broad reading list whose content and structure is used as the basis for my syllabi. Nonetheless, this document should give you the basic idea behind my approach.

Reading List

1. Social Construction

Social construction — it’s easy to invoke but hard to say what it is, exactly. We examine foundational approaches to the metaphysics of social construction in analytic philosophy.

Required

• Searle, J. R. (1995). The Construction of Social Reality. Simon; Schuster.
• Hacking, I. (1999). The social construction of what? Harvard University Press.
• Haslanger, S. A. (2012). Resisting reality: Social construction and social critique. Oxford University Press.
• Ásta. (2018). Categories We Live By: The Construction of Sex, Gender, Race, and Other Social Categories. Oxford University Press.

Recommended

• Foucault, M. (1976). The History of Sexuality: The Will to Knowledge. Penguin.
• Diaz-Leon, E. (2015). What Is Social Construction?: What Is Social Construction? European Journal of Philosophy, 23(4), 1137–1152. https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12033
• Mallon, R. (2016). The Construction of Human Kinds. Oxford University Press.

2. Collective Intentionality

What does it mean to act as a group? To have a group mind? Some early important accounts, with a bunch of critical takes.

Required

• Bratman, M. (2014). Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together. Oxford University Press.
• Gilbert, M. (1990). Walking Together: A Paradigmatic Social Phenomenon. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 15, 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1990.tb00202.x
• List, C., & Pettit, P. (2011). Group Agency: The Possibility, Design, and Status of Corporate Agents. Oxford University Press.

Recommended

• Velleman, J. D. (1997). How to Share an Intention. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 57(1), 29–50.
• Tuomela, R. (2002). The Philosophy of Social Practices: A Collective Acceptance View. Cambridge University Press.
• Kutz, C. (2000). Acting Together. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 61(1), 1–31. https://doi.org/10.2307/2653401
• Shapiro, S. (2014). Massively Shared Agency. In M. Vargas & G. Yaffe (Eds.), Rational and Social Agency: The Philosophy of Michael Bratman (pp. 257–293). Oxford University Press.
• Bratman, M. E. (2022). Shared and Institutional Agency: Toward a Planning Theory of Human Practical Organization. Oxford University Press.
• Burman, Å. (2023). Nonideal Social Ontology: The Power View. Oxford University Press.
• Richardson, K. (2024). Social Change, Solidarity, and Mass Agency. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 105(2), 210–232. https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12455

3. Social Groups

The metaphysics of social groups. Our first taste of the mixing of analytic philosophy of language and metaphysics into social ontology.

Required

• Uzquiano, G. (2004). The Supreme Court and the Supreme Court Justices: A Metaphysical Puzzle. Noûs, 38(1), 135–153. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2004.00465.x
• Ritchie, K. (2013). What are groups? Philosophical Studies, 166(2), 257–272. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-0030-5
• Hawley, K. (2017). Social Mereology. Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 3(4), 395–411. https://doi.org/10.1017/apa.2017.33
• Horden, J., & López de Sa, D. (2020). Groups as pluralities. Synthese. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02715-y

Recommended

• Schnieder, B. (2006). ’By Leibiniz’s Law’: Remarks On A Fallacy. The Philosophical Quarterly, 56(222), 39–54. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9213.2005.00427.x
• Effingham, N. (2010). The metaphysics of groups. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 149(2), 251–267. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40606354
• Thomasson, A. L. (2019). The ontology of social groups. Synthese, 196(12), 4829–4845. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1185-y
• Epstein, B. (2019). What are social groups? Their metaphysics and how to classify them. Synthese, 196(12), 4899–4932. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1387-y
• Richardson, K. (2022). Social Groups Are Concrete Material Particulars. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 52(4), 468–483. https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2022.32

4. Externalism

Debates in social ontology about gender and race have had a connection to views about concepts and semantic externalism. Some background in externalism and analytic philosophy of language will be necessary.

Required

• Quine, W. V. (1951). Two Dogmas of Empiricism. The Philosophical Review, 60(1), 20–43. https://doi.org/10.2307/2181906
• Putnam, H. (1973). Meaning and reference. Journal of Philosophy, 70(19), 699–711.
• Appiah, K. A. (1998). Race, Culture, Identity: Misunderstood Connections. Princeton University Press. https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9781400822096-002/html
• Haslanger, S. (2000). Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them to Be? Noûs, 34(1), 31–55. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2671972

Recommended

• Putnam, H. (1975). The meaning of ’meaning’. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 7, 131–193.
• Glasgow, J., Haslanger, S., Jeffers, C., & Spencer, Q. (2019). What is Race?: Four Philosophical Views. Oxford University Press.
• Haslanger, S. (2020). Going on, Not in the Same Way. In Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics (pp. 230–260). Oxford University Press.

5. Grounding

The fundamentalist era begins. Applications of metaphysical grounding to the social world, with an emphasis on the individualism debate.

Required

• Schaffer, J. (2009). On What Grounds What. In D. Manley, D. J. Chalmers, & R. Wasserman (Eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology (pp. 347–383). Oxford University Press.
• Epstein, B. (2015). The Ant Trap: Rebuilding the Foundations of the Social Sciences. Oxford University Press.
• Haslanger, S. (2022). Failures of Methodological Individualism: The Materiality of Social Systems. Journal of Social Philosophy, 53(4), 512–534. https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12373
• Griffith, A. M. (2018). Social construction: Big-G grounding, small-g realization. Philosophical Studies, 175(1), 241–260. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-017-0865-x

Recommended

• Rosen, G. (2010). Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction. In B. Hale & A. Hoffmann (Eds.), Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology (pp. 109–135). Oxford University Press.
• Fine, K. (2012). Guide to Ground. In F. Correia & B. Schnieder (Eds.), Metaphysical Grounding (pp. 37–80). Cambridge University Press.
• Wilson, J. M. (2014). No Work for a Theory of Grounding. Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 57(5-6), 535–579.

6. Naturalness and Feminist Metaphysics

Introducing metaphysical naturalness. Also introduces feminist challenges to fundamentalism.

Required

• Sider, T. (2011). Writing the Book of the World. Oxford University Press.
• Barnes, E. (2014). Going Beyond the Fundamental: Feminism in Contemporary Metaphysics. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 114(3pt3), 335–351.
• Mikkola, M. (2015). Doing Ontology and Doing Justice: What Feminist Philosophy Can Teach Us About Meta-Metaphysics. Inquiry, 58(7-8), 780–805. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2015.1083469
• Taylor, E. (2023). Substantive Social Metaphysics. Philosophers’ Imprint, 23(0). https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.1972

Recommended

• Taylor, E. (2016). Naturalness in Context. Inquiry, 59(4), 319–342. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2015.1050450
• Barnes, E. (2017). Realism and social structure. Philosophical Studies, 174(10), 2417–2433. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0743-y
• Mikkola, M. (2016). Feminist Metaphysics and Philosophical Methodology. Philosophy Compass, 11(11), 661–670. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12349
• Mikkola, M. (2017). On the apparent antagonism between feminist and mainstream metaphysics. Philosophical Studies, 174(10), 2435–2448. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0732-1

7. Responses to Feminist Critiques

Required

• Sider, T. (2017). Substantivity in feminist metaphysics. Philosophical Studies, 174(10), 2467–2478.
• Richardson, K. (2023). The Metaphysics of gender is (Relatively) substantial. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 107(1), 192–207. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12916
• Schaffer, J. (2017). Social construction as grounding; or: Fundamentality for feminists, a reply to Barnes and Mikkola. Philosophical Studies, 174(10), 2449–2465. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0738-8
• Griffith, A. M. (2018). Social Construction and Grounding. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 97(2), 393–409. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12376

Recommended

• Richardson, K. (2023). Critical social ontology. Synthese, 201(6), 204. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-023-04197-0
• Diaz-Leon, E. (2019). Descriptive vs. Ameliorative Projects: The Role of Normative Considerations. In H. Cappelen, D. Plunkett, & A. Burgess (Eds.), Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics (pp. 170–186). Oxford University Press.

8. Essentialism

Don’t forget about essence! New essentialisms — good ones — have arrived. We review old biological essentialisms before moving on to new social essentialisms.

Required

• Fine, K. (1994). Essence and Modality: The Second Philosophical Perspectives Lecture. Philosophical Perspectives, 8, 1. https://doi.org/10.2307/2214160
• Stoljar, N. (1995). Essence, Identity, and the Concept of Woman. Philosophical Topics, 23(2), 261–293. https://www.jstor.org/stable/43154214
• Witt, C. (2011). The Metaphysics of Gender. Oxford University Press.
• Passinsky, A. (2021). Finean Feminist Metaphysics. Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, 64(9), 937–954.
• Passinsky, A. (2021). Norm and Object: A Normative Hylomorphic Theory of Social Objects. Philosopher’s Imprint, 21(25). http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3521354.0021.025

Recommended

• Koslicki, K. (2008). The Structure of Objects. Oxford University Press.
• Bach, T. (2012). Gender is a natural kind with a historical essence. Ethics, 122(2), 231–272.
• Ásta. (2013). Knowledge of Essence: The Conferralist Story. Philosophical Studies, 166(1), 21–32. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-012-0019-0
• Mason, R. (2016). The metaphysics of social kinds. Philosophy Compass, 11(12), 841–850. https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12381
• Mason, R. (2021). Social kinds are essentially mind-dependent. Philosophical Studies, 178(12), 3975–3994. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-021-01633-0

9. Anchoring

Anchoring is a grounding-like relation that isn’t quite grounding. It has applications to the social world, but it has puzzling modal behavior… Let’s investigate.

Required

• Epstein, B. (2015). The Ant Trap: Rebuilding the Foundations of the Social Sciences. Oxford University Press.
• Schaffer, J. (2019). Anchoring as Grounding: On Epstein’s the Ant Trap. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 99(3), 749–767. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12645
• Epstein, B. (2019). Anchoring versus Grounding: Reply to Schaffer. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 99(3), 768–781. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12644
• Mikkola, M. (2019). Grounding and anchoring: On the structure of Epstein’s social ontology. Inquiry, 62(2), 198–216. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2017.1312743
• Epstein, B. (2019). Replies to Hawley, Mikkola, and Hindriks. Inquiry. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0020174X.2018.1502935

Recommended

• Einheuser, I. (2006). Counterconventional Conditionals. Philosophical Studies, 127(3), 459–482. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-004-7790-5
• Kocurek, A. W., Jerzak, E., & Rudolph, R. E. (2020). Against Conventional Wisdom. Philosopher’s Imprint, 20(22). http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3521354.0020.022
• Finocchiaro, P. (2021). How to Project a Socially Constructed Sexual Orientation. Journal of Social Ontology, 7(2), 173–203. https://doi.org/10.1515/jso-2021-0005
• Pagano, E. (2023). Social construction, social kinds and exportation. Analysis, anad044. https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anad044
• Baysan, U. (2025). Social Constructs and How Not to Ground Them. Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2024.2305390

10. Truthmaking

Truthmaker theory — old and new — makes an appearance.

Required

• Asay, J. (2023). Truthmaking. Cambdrige University Press.
• Griffith, A. M. (2025). Truth and Social Reality. Oxford University Press.

Recommended

• Cameron, R. P. (2010). How to have a radically minimal ontology. Philosophical Studies, 151(2), 249–264.
• Fine, K. (2017). A Theory of Truthmaker Content I: Conjunction, Disjunction and Negation. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 46(6), 625–674.
• Fine, K. (2017). A Theory of Truthmaker Content II: Subject-matter, Common Content, Remainder and Ground. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 46(6), 675–702.
• Jago, M. (2017). Propositions as Truthmaker Conditions. Argumenta, 2(2), 293–308.

11. Deflationist Critiques

The deflationist critiques the use of high church metaphysics in social ontology. Another approach is offered.

Required

• Thomasson, A. L. (2017). Metaphysical Disputes and Metalinguistic Negotiation. Analytic Philosophy, 58(1), 1–28. https://doi.org/10.1111/phib.12087
• Thomasson, A. (2025). Rethinking Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.

Recommended

• Plunkett, D., & Sundell, T. (2013). Disagreement and the Semantics of Normative and Evaluative Terms. Philosopher’s Imprint, 13(23). http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3521354.0013.023