Craving the Incomprehensible
I have been thinking about the kind of public philosophy that people consume and the kind that people do not. There are certain public philosophers who are massively popular despite the actual content of their views being very obscure to readers. Slavoj Zizek is the person I am thinking of.
This isn’t a criticism of Zizek. Being obscure is not the same as being nonsensical (or a bad writer). But it seems like people are attracted to Zizek’s work in virtue of his obscurity, not despite it.
This goes against the expectation, at least among many philosophers, that public philosophy should be clear, that people avoid academic philosophy because of its obscurity. I think the kind of obscurity matters quite a bit.
Example: I think the public would be turned off by a higher-order metaphysician that refuses to simplify their ideas. A Hegelian idealist, on the other hand, might be able to get away with their brand of obscurity.
Not sure what more to say about this, but it is striking.