About Me

Philosophical Persona

I am an old-school systematic metaphysician in a new-school specialized world. I also introduce elements of pragmatism and social justice into high church analytic metaphysics (and vice versa).

Social Ontology

In social ontology, I argue for a spatial, scalar theory of social categories. Instead of identifying as men or women, many people now identify as non-binary, agender, or genderqueer. Instead of identifying as gay or straight, many people now identify as bisexual, pansexual, or demisexual. There is an emerging shift away from identifying with the standard binary gender (male/female) and sexual orientation (gay/straight) categories. This shift has frightened some and been a source of confusion for others. My new book presents a new way to understand gender and sexuality beyond the binary categories: the spatial theory. On this view, gender and sexuality are best understood as social spaces that individuals locate themselves within. For a longer summary, see my book page.

More broadly, my work in social ontology explores the idea of social indeterminacy and vagueness. The social world seems vague, at many cases. It is vague whether a certain law applies, whether a certain person counts as eligible to be a member of a group, whether a certain social norm is being obeyed. What do we think of such cases? And what do we do in such cases? My work explores the idea that the social world is really, truly, genuinely, deeply indeterminate.

Social Philosophy

The spatial theory of gender and sexual orientation is largely descriptive. I asked: what is gender and sexual orientation? My next project turns to a normative question: what should gender and sexual orientation be? More precisely, I aim to conceptually engineer sexual orientation concepts — gay, straight, bisexual, pansexual, etc. It is natural to think that sexual orientation concepts help us navigate everyday sexual relationships. Because we cannot directly perceive each other’s sexual dispositions, we rely on conceptual tools to communicate them. There are two main critiques of ordinary sexual orientation concepts. The political critique holds that they entrench oppressive norms, structuring society around binary sex and heterosexuality. The prudential critique holds that they fail to serve their practical function. Sexual orientation concepts are either bad or highly inefficient ways to achieve their stated aims.

To reform orientation concepts, I propose sexual aestheticism, the view that sexual orientation concepts ought to be understood as aesthetic concepts. Their value lies not in prudential efficiency or political utility but in how they stylize sexuality. Instead of thinking of sexual orientation concepts as instruments for satisfying preferences or gaining political power, I give an account of how sexual orientation concepts are better recast as part of everyday aesthetics. Everyday aesthetics concerns more humdrum examples of aesthetic value — e.g., personal appearance, bodily presentation, fashion, etc — as opposed to museum art or formal artistic performances. Sexual aestheticism preserves what is distinctively valuable about orientation concepts while discarding the harmful functions of existing concepts.

General Metaphysics

Outside of social ontology and social philosophy, my main research project concerns general metaphysics and pragmatism. Traditionally, metaphysics is the study of the most general features of reality; metaphysics is neither a conceptual nor empirical inquiry. I ask: what becomes of metaphysics once we take pragmatism seriously? Contemporary neopragmatists such as Huw Price and Amie Thomasson offer two main strategies: rejection and reconstruction. Price argues that many metaphysical questions should be dissolved by examining the practical roles of our concepts. Instead of asking “What are numbers?” the pragmatist suggests we should ask “What role does number-talk play in practical life?”

I am currently pursuing a reconstructive approach to metaphysics, building on some of the insights of neopragmatists. I am developing what I call hermeneutic pragmatism, a view that treats interpretation as central to the practical role of concepts. Drawing on Hans-Georg Gadamer and other figures from the phenomenological and idealist traditions, I argue that metaphysical inquiry is an interpretive practice through which we understand both the world and our place within it. This project, still in development, aims to show that metaphysical questions simultaneously (a) have objectively true answers and (b) are best understood as interpretive questions shaped by human values, practices, and forms of life.

In the past, I have also defended pluralism about metaphysical grounding. For more specific examples of my research, see my publications page.

Areas

Areas of Specialization: Metaphysics, Social Ontology, Social Philosophy

Areas of Competence: Philosophy of Language, Social Philosophy, Logic

Education

Massachusetts Institute of Technology | PhD in Philosophy | 2012 - 2017

University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill | BA in Philosophy | 2008 - 2012

Spirit Animal

The octopus. I have my hands on a lot of things.